Interdependence, collective identities and common institutions are the preconditions for the evolution of a pluralistic security community. While the interaction of the states of Southern Latin America already meets the first two criteria, this article focuses on the third one, particularly the common institutions of the regional defence and security sector. The bilaterally organised defence cooperation has been attested democratic deficiencies be- Article Outline
Introduction
One of the most striking features of the political development of Southern Latin America over the last two decades is the close connection between democratisation, regional integration and security policy 1 (see Hirst 1998 , Rojas Aravena 1996 . It is becoming increasingly obvious that geopolitical considerations and traditional threat scenarios between the states are of less importance. First steps of a security political agreement have been introduced such as arms control agreements, publication of military white books, mutual transparency of the defence budgets. The more resistant against regression these cooperative processes are, the more the assumption by Hurrell (see 1998) is confirmed that a regional security community in Southern Latin America exists between Argentina and Brazil or that it is 1 In the following the area of security policy includes all institutional and procedural aspects of political actions, which lead to the protection of the population against external dangers. This includes a) potential transnational, non-military threats in Southern Latin America (drug and arms trafficking, money laundering as forms of organised crime, transnational activities of guerrilla organisations, international terrorism, proliferation of means of mass destruction); b) defence policies including the protection of the territorial integrity of a state against external attacks carried out by force of arms; and c) all areas of foreign policies which aim at bilateral, subregional, continental or global cooperation in security matters, conflict resolution and the prevention of organised violent acts. about to develop (critically of this Schmitter 1991 , Hirst 1998 . This paper will analyse the evolution of the potential pluralistic security community in Southern Latin America by modifying the qualifiers of Karl W. Deutsch (1957) , whilst focusing on the institutionalisation of the intraregional defence and security policy cooperation.
Achieving common rules on the regional level between smaller groups of nations is more likely than the unanimous and consensual acceptance of security policy rules within the world wide context, since these smaller groups have probably got partially parallel normative patterns from the beginning. Accordingly this applies even more to subregions such as Southern Latin America. After all the states of the subregion look back on a wide range of common historic experiences: The rule of colonial powers until the 19 th century, the military dictatorships till the end of the 20 th century and the following processes of democratisation. It is true that the international treaties mean considerable achievements in the field of the cooperative security, but they aim more at the enclosure of potential conflicts than the development of collective security structures: The reduction of tensions and the reduced reciprocal perception of threat resulting from confidence building measures and regimes for arms control prevent the repeated development of mutual distrust and the revival of an power balance discourse (Hurrell 1998: 540) . It must be taken into account that the relations between the neighbouring countries Brazil and Argentina as well as between Chile and Argentina has mainly been marked by hostilities for almost two centuries. The respective neighbouring state held the primary potential of danger in the conflict hypotheses of these countries. The friendly relations between the countries in the South of Latin America, which could only develop after a protracted removal of the threatening scenarios and the military doctrines derived from them, have only existed since the beginning of the 1990s (see Flemes   2003a ).
In spite of the rapprochement between the Mercosur countries no security political regime or another subregional security system has derived from the intraregional cooperation so far. Neither have the actors involved decided that the objective of the ongoing process should be the formalization or institutionalisation of the security and defence policy collaboration. On the contrary this is about a widely open process, the result of which can hardly be forecasted by politicians and scientists. Therefore the first step has got to be the tracing of the actual development of the international cooperation over the past years in order to determine their degree of formalization and effect with respect to specific measures and cooperation forums. Only on this empirical foundation a hypothesis on the development of a pluralistic security community with the core countries Brazil, Argentina and Chile can be verified or disproved. But before examining the bi-and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of the subregion in detail, a spotlight on the theoretical concept of security communities shall demonstrate how it can help explaining the security and defence policy cooperation process in Southern Latin America.
Applying Karl W. Deutsch's Qualifiers of Security Communities: Interdependence, Collective Identities and Common Institutions
According to Karl W. Deutsch (1961: 98) a security community is identified by the following features:
"[…] a security community […] is a group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with reasonable certainty over a long period of time."
Thus besides the security policy cooperation Deutsch (1957) had defined stable relations between the social environments of the states as characteristic of a security community.
Deutsch considered the following components to be essential to a security community: (1) mutual interdependence within the intraregional relations, (2) a high degree of collective identity and common values as well as (3) a tight network of common institutions and standards, which regulates the relations and contribute to the peaceful conflict resolution. By the security and defence political processes of institutionalisation between Brazil and its partner states the presented study throws particularly light on the third component suggested by Deutsch. In the following it will be empirically justified, why it is assumed in this study that the intraregional relations in Southern Latin America already meet the first two conditions for the existence of a security community for the most part.
(1) The mutual interdependence of the societies that proves to be particularly well developed in the sector of subregional economic relations in the context of the Mercosur is without doubt an important basis for the security political rapprochement between the states of Southern Latin America. Aggregated data on trade, direct investments and capital flows underline the relatively high -with respect to a developing region -degree of economic integration of the subregion (see IMF 2001a , 2001b , IDB 2002a , 2002b , Lacarte/Granados 2004 as well as Mühlich 2004) . Today the Mercosur is rated as the world's third biggest trade block after the EU and the NAFTA (Gratius 2001: 42) . 70% of Latin American foreign trade and the direct investments (Nunnenkamp 2003: 30f.) Another aspect of the progressive economic interdependence implies the intraregional direct investments. 3 Yoguel (see 1996) observes the development of transnational networks of enterprises in the Mercosur. Especially between Argentine and Brazilian smaller and medium sized enterprises in the sector of sugar production, in the petrochemical and the dairy industry. While the development of regional networks between companies seems to be progressing slowly, greater dynamics can be observed on the level of the business unions and chambers of commerce (Pohl 2003: 94f.) . 4 Already in 1986 the central trade unions of Southern Latin America founded the Coordinadora de Centrales Sindicales del Cono Sur (CCSCS) as a regional forum for discussion and cooperation. 5 (2) Especially the forms of the transnational cooperation in the subregional economic sector do not only represent the growing interdependence between the Mercosur states, but they also imply that the market economy is one of several common value systems of the societies of the Mercosur. According to Karl W. Deutsch (see 1957 ) mutual interdependence and   2 Paraguay, for example, transacts 70% of its foreign trade with the Mercosur states and Uruguay 45%. In 2003 Argentina exported 34% of its total exports to the member states of the Mercosur after all. In contrast to this Brazil is far less dependent on its integration partners concerning trade, since merely 19% of its total exports were delivered to the Mercosur-area in 2003 (see Lacarte/ Granados 2004). 3 More than 350 Brazilian enterprises are active in Argentina and more than 150 Argentine companies are active in Brazil (Eßer 2000: 4) . Eßer regards these enterprises as motors of the economic integration in the Mercosur. According to Sangmeister (2001: 15) the considerable progresses on the micro level of the economic integration lead to an increasing institutionalisation of a Mercosur's own entrepreneurship. 4 In 1991, for example, the national unions of the industrial companies in the Mercosur founded the Consejo Industrial del Mercosur (CIM). Even various national industry associations (i.e. petrochemicals and automobile industry) collaborate more intensely and represent their interests commonly at international forums (Hasenclever et al. 1999 : 417, Casaburi et al. 1998 . 5 Since the beginning of the 1990s the topics of the integration process have been gaining importance within the CCSCS. In June 1997 the trade unions of the Mercosur states organised the trade union-and social summit meeting of the Mecosur in Asuncion (Garnelo 1998: 51) . Since then the Presidents of the national trade unions are meeting for regular conferences. Internacionales (CARI) the majority of the interviewed persons -amongst them Argentine opinion leaders from society, politics, sciences an economy -regarded the subregional integration as most important foreign political objective out of a selection of twelve (CARI 2002: 19) . 7 (3) The development of institutions is attached with great importance in the formation of a regional security community. In contrast to the first mentioned criteria the process of institutionalisation between the states of Southern Latin America -especially in the sector of security-and defence policy -is not obvious, but has to be shown in the course of this article.
The regional institutions must be strong enough in order to generate "mutually reliable expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch 1957: 5) . Force is ruled out as a means of conflict resolution. Stable and institutionalised cooperative relations between the political systems build the infrastructure for the overcoming of the security dilemma within the security community.
The lacking institutionalisation of the cooperation between the states of Southern Latin America seems to counter the development of a subregional security community at first Inquiring about the meaning of the South American states for the regional security policy the Argentines assign the leading role in South America to the ABC-states. At the same time the greatest influence is awarded to Brazil, followed by Chile and Argentina (CARI 2002: 34 Parliament is planned for the future). However the security political cooperation and its institutionalisation within the Mercosur is continuously underestimated in the hardly existent specific literature.
The Institutionalisation of Mercosur's Defence and Security Cooperation
Ultimately a rising degree of cooperation can only be measured by the increase in the bilateral and multilateral channels between the countries. This fact is taken into account in this article, which summarizes the bi-and multilateral cooperation forums of the subregion. At "On the military as well as the diplomatic level all actors involved are aware that dispute with the neighbouring countries can impossibly be settled by military force […] military actors only talk of cooperation, not of integration on the defence sector" (Rial 1994: 38) .
The more the observed cooperation processes turn out to be resistant to regression, the more indication there is for the assumption that a regional security community is about to develop in the South of Latin America with the core countries Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
In the following the single forums of the defence political cooperation with Brazilian participation are analysed. It will be looked at the two military and defence political cooperation mechanisms introduced earlier at first. These cooperation forums that are chiefly coordinated by the Ministries of Defence -including technical collaboration and personnel exchange between the armed services -are mainly of a bilateral nature.
The Consultation Mechanism for International Security and Defence Issues (MCC) 8
In April From the beginning the absence of a civilian ministry of defence in Brazil has contributed to an asymmetry within the bilateral relations, which is rather unusual for the actors involved.
The ministry founded in 1999 has only got involved in the work of the bilateral groups more intensely over the last two years, especially in the operating level (MAE). With the starting consolidation of the structures of the still quite young ministry and the inherent capability to coordinate a greater regularity of the MAE-meetings can be noticed as well as a more explicit subject agenda since 2002. However, up until now the Argentine actors show greater initiative. They can refer to experiences already made at the bilateral defence cooperation with Chile (COMPERSEG) and are obviously more interested in the bilateral cooperation forum. Three of the so far four meetings of the MAE were organized by the Argentine government and took place in Buenos Aires.
By this two aspects are addressed, which might complicate a further development and intensification of the MCC: Asymmetries and diverging interests between the two countries and internal factors, such as different patterns of civil-military relations, which the late foundation of the Brazilian Ministry of Defence already points at. Another problem implies the lack of transparency of the investigated defence political committees. This problem could be solved by coupling to the academic community, which is equipped with a greater public reach.
Divergent security political interests do not only result from the different military, political and economic potential of the two South American countries, but especially from the different claims and aspirations. While the Argentines are increasingly keen on the subregional cooperation and mainly critical to a "special partnership" with the USA, as it had still been intended by Carlos Menem, the regional power Brazil is trying to diversify its international relations. Brazil's turning to other regional powers (Russia, India, China, South Africa), which also implies security political components, is critically observed by the Argentine conservative side (see La Nación, 18 March, 2004) . Argentina reproaches Brasilia for ultimately pursuing global objectives and using the Mercosur merely as a medium to position herself as a global player. These voices are confirmed by Brazil's sole claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations, should it be reformed.
However, the moderate Brazilian engagement respectively the sluggish consolidation of the bilateral committees in the defence sector cannot only be explained by diverging roles within the international system. Comparative analyses come to the result that the civil supremacy in the Argentine case has developed the most since the country's economic decline under the military government, the lost Falkland-Conflict and the following discreditation of the Argentine Armed Forces (see Diamint 1999 , Diamond/Plattner 1998 , Heinz 2001 , Hunter 1998 , Pion-Berlin 2001 . Nevertheless the Argentine Armed Forces do also have influence on the military and defence policy. Therefore the Argentine Ministry of Defence has hardly influence on structural changes within the military institutions. This is due to quickly fluctuating staff combined with a chaos concerning competences. In the international collaboration the Argentine armed services pursue the interests of their institutions to an accordingly great extent, since the Ministry of Defence expresses hardly any political targets that could focus the objectives of the armed services within the bi-or multilateral military cooperation. As far as that goes the Argentine Ministry of Defence is able to make the Army, Air Force and Navy proposals at the most, but not to exercise the command authority. Apart from the civil control deficit the Argentine Ministry of Defence is certified considerable functional deficits at the implementation of defence political defaults that would have to precede the goal-directed intensification of the defence political cooperation (Radseck 2004a: 129) .
Previous analyses has already detected functional deficits of a similar kind in the Brazilian
Ministry of Defence at the definition and implementation of the security and defence policies as well as a weak civil control over the Armed Forces. Up until today the defence policy has to be regarded as a military enclave in the Brazilian case (Flemes 2004a) 
The Multilateral Containment of Transnational Threats in Mercosur
The Mercosur states are confronted with a number of transnational threats. The protagonists of these dangers are no longer the states, but guerrillas, paramilitaries, the organized crime "The parallel running processes of the globalization and the regional integration lead to the stage where even the transnational dimension of the criminality proves to be increasingly more pronounced and thus more alarming. Amongst others organized groups in the sectors of drug traffic, terrorism, money laundering, smuggle, child trade, robbery and theft of vehicles, illegal dealing with radioactive material, illegal migration and environmental criminality belong to this sector. [...] In order to respond these new challenges it is necessary to act commonly and in a coordinated way on the regional level. Only by means of cooperation the different forms of the nationally and transnationally organized criminality can be contained effectively. Particularly those forms of crime that can -due to their transnational character -not be contained on the national level threat the common subregional security to a high degree." In content the subregional information system is intended to consist of three components: In doing so data relating to persons and goods are completed by a register on criminal cases and the police operations connected with them. Data with reference to persons of the first component includes national as well as international arrest warrants, missing announcements and summons as well as entry and departure prohibitions declared by the Mercosur countries. Furthermore the SISME stores information on issued and refused visas of citizens from non-Mercosur states as well as a register of notification of persons from a third country residing in the member states.
The data relating to goods, which form the second component of the SISME, refer to confis- This realization is owed to a pilot project for the reduction of the drug demand in which related municipals of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay participate. Each time respectively two neighbouring municipals cooperate, the state borders of which cover a distance of 7,100 kilometres altogether. On the one hand the integration of the border districts is intended to be supported by means of transnational activities in the sectors of prevention, police investigation and public education. On the other hand the population of the border towns is meant to be mobilised and sensitised to the drug problems. In order to achieve these aims first of all multipliers were integrated into the project via information meetings. These agents included teachers, doctors, local politicians and police officers. In a second step binational anti-drug councils were established in the municipalities, which dealt with legal and illegal aspects of the use of drugs and the drug demand in content. They also organized discussion meetings on the subject. The six months lasting pilot project ended in The results of the analysis of the security and defence policy institutions show that these are on the whole "strong and disseminated enough in order to generate an expectation of a peaceful change over a long period of time" (Deutsch 1961: 98) . It is true that the defence political cooperation mechanisms have been attested democratic deficiencies, because mili- states pursue this political objective, the mentioned cooperation mechanisms are the infrastructure that can put it into effect.
